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ABSTRACT
The vulnerability and resilience of communities to hazards is a concept that has
gained traction in the research community in recent decades. Climate change, combined
with increasing damages from natural hazards, has energized researchers and practitioners
alike to identify the risks to people and places from future losses. Military communities
support large military bases and are composed of service members, their families, and
civilian populations alike. Due to the presence of military installations and military
populations, the characteristics of the population and influences in military communities
are unique. However, there is a gap in current research to assess whether the unique
characteristics of military populations and places extend to the underlying social
vulnerability and resiliency in the community and what the contributing factors are.
Additionally, hazard losses in military communities and their relative hazardousness has
yet to be identified, even though significant disasters have negatively impacted military
bases and communities in recent years.
Hazard losses, social vulnerability, and community resilience are the three
components in the hazardousness of military communities that are explored in this
research. Hazard losses are quantified using the Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database
for the United States (SHELDUS), while social vulnerability and resilience use the Social
Vulnerability Index (SoVI® ) and the Baseline Resilience Indicators for Communities
(BRIC) as their measures. SoVI and BRIC enable relative comparisons between places and
are the best available indices designed to measure the multidimensional constructs of social
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vulnerability and resilience, respectively. Descriptive statistics, inferential statistics, and
spatial statistics were performed to assess differences in the variables.
Military communities have significantly lower levels of hazard losses and social
vulnerability than other communities in the United States, while significant differences in
community resilience were not detected. When exploring the factors of social vulnerability,
lower age dependency and higher service sector employment are the main contributors to
those differences regardless of location. Air Force communities are the most socially
vulnerable to hazards among military communities, while Navy communities, which are
located along the coasts and have higher amounts of wealth, are the least socially
vulnerable. For resilience, lower amount of community capital in military communities is
the dominant factor and is consistent across geographies. Navy communities demonstrate
the lowest resiliency levels, driven by significantly lower levels of community capital. In
contrast, Army communities have the highest levels and are mostly located in high
community capital clusters. Hazard losses in military communities are highest near the
Gulf of Mexico, Alaska, and the Dakotas. Select military communities in south Texas, New
Mexico, and southern Alabama have above average levels of social vulnerability and
hazard losses, and below average levels of resilience.
The results demonstrate that military communities' hazardousness is different from
those of other communities in the United States and even within military communities
based on the type of military base in those communities. Trends were not always consistent
as unique findings occurred in the Hampton Roads region of Virginia and the Washington
D.C metropolitan area. Some findings, such as those related to the importance of
community capital to resilience, support the conclusions of research done at the community
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level and those at the individual and family level in military homes. The findings enable
community leaders, state officials, and leaders in the Department of Defense to target
critical areas that can reduce the hazardousness and improve military communities'
resilience in the United States.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Military installations are unique places in the landscape because they are fenced off
and restrict access to a small percentage of the population but influence and impact the
places around them. Military installations are self-governing and operate on many levels
as independent cities, yet there are strong connections and links to the cities and
communities outside their fences. Natural hazards do not observe the physical and political
boundaries between military installations and local communities. Their negative impacts
are felt on both places, often testing the relationship and connection between them. Military
installations are sensitive to changes in the local community, and communities are sensitive
to changes on the military installation. For example, many military installations rely on the
local community for electric power generation and water treatment and are directly
influenced by communities' policies regarding local development and land use along the
borders (GAO, 2020). Local communities are likewise impacted economically and
environmentally through the jobs and contracts a military installation provides, support for
local school districts and services provided by DoD programs, and the military’s use of the
land and environmental pollution (Woodward, 2015). These connections often go
unrecognized but are especially important to understand during times of crisis.
Military installations and local communities also face the same threats as other
places in the United States, such as climate change and the increasing cost of disasters. The
primary goal of this research is to understand the underlying conditions in “military
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communities,” or communities heavily influenced by military installations, which may lead
to different or unique disaster outcomes than other communities. By understanding the
differences and unique characteristics in military communities' hazardousness, then
policies and programs designed to reduce disaster risk can be optimized to meet the
community's needs.
In 2019 the Department of Defense published a list of installations at risk to climate
change in response to a congressional mandate. However, only recurrent flooding, drought,
desertification, wildfires, and thawing permafrost were considered in the report (DoD,
2019a). The report was the first time the military published and recognized the impacts of
climate-sensitive hazards on military installations. In the past, the DoD focused its efforts
studying the impacts of climate change on military operations abroad, such as dealing with
instability from a rising number of climate refugees in places like Africa and in the security
of new shipping lanes opening in the Artic (Brzoska, 2012; U.S. Army War College, 2019).
Although the recent identification of risks to hazards on military installations was long
overdue, it failed to quantify the risk to hazards on these places. It also did not include any
consideration of the impacts on the surrounding communities. This gap left local leaders
in military communities, such as installation commanders and city managers, to work
together to identify and mitigate their risk to hazards (McCollester, 2020). However, the
current bottom-up approach lacks direction and standardization across the DoD, creating
inefficiencies and knowledge gaps. Recently, the DoD has named climate change a threat
to national security, which has accelerated the need to quantify and understand hazard
impacts in military communities (DoD, 2021).
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A communities’ ability to respond and recover from hazards is largely dependent
upon the underlying social vulnerability and resiliency of those places, as well as the
amount of damage sustained during the event.

Communities that require the most

assistance in disasters are usually ones with higher social vulnerability, lower community
resilience, and the most damage. However, these relationships are not linear and uniform
(Cutter et al., 2014). Many factors in the community contribute to its social vulnerability
and resilience to hazards, including the underlying socio-economic and demographic
characteristics, social organizations, built environment, and others. Previous studies in
hazards research have explored the differences in vulnerability and resiliency across the
United States (Cutter et al., 2014). However, no research has identified differences in the
vulnerability or resiliency between military communities and non-military communities,
or the magnitude of damages as a result of hazards. Doing so will provide actionable
evidence for military and community leaders to work together to reduce and mitigate
negative disaster outcomes.
The method used to accomplish this will be to quantify and compare any differences
in the social vulnerability and resiliency of military communities to non-military
communities, as well as by the type of base that the community supports (Army, Navy, and
Air Force). Hazard losses are also assessed to identify military communities that have
sustained significant damage from past hazards, and whether those damages are different
from other communities. Identifying any differences in these places can help policy and
decision-makers focus resources and enact policies that benefit those communities. The
following research questions are asked and used as a guide throughout the research:
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Research Question (RQ) 1a: How do natural hazard losses compare between
military communities and non-military communities?
RQ 1b: How do natural hazard losses compare within military communities by the
type of military base (Army, Navy, Air Force)?
RQ 2a: How does the underlying social vulnerability compare between military and
non-military communities?
RQ 2b: How does social vulnerability compare within military communities by the
type of military base?
RQ 3a: How does the underlying community resiliency compare between military
and non-military communities?
RQ 3b: How does community resiliency compare within military communities by
the type of military base?
Chapter 2 discusses the existing literature related to military installations, natural
hazard losses, social vulnerability, and community resiliency. Several gaps exist in the
understanding of vulnerability and resiliency in military communities. Therefore, research
is collected across disciplines and related to existing natural hazards research. Chapter 3
explains the data and methods used to answer the above research questions, including the
statistical and spatial analysis. Chapter 4 describes and explains the results of the analysis.
Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the implications of the results, other considerations in military
communities, and future directions in the research of natural hazards and military
geography.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Researchers in geography, anthropology, economics, psychology, engineering, and
others have published numerous studies on military bases, communities, natural hazards,
social vulnerability, and resilience. However, each has a different perspective and focus
but do relate to the primary themes of the thesis—social vulnerability hazard losses, and
resilience. The literature is organized as an integrated review of the primary themes as
follows. First, existing literature is reviewed identifying the traditionally view of militaries
in civil-military relations and disaster response, and how military bases have been
identified to influence the disaster cycle. Second, key concepts in social vulnerability are
reviewed and how those relate to military geographies and military populations. Third, key
concepts in community resiliency are reviewed and how those are related to military
geographies and populations. Lastly, the geography of military bases and their
hazardousness is reviewed, providing necessary background for following sections that
have studied hazards and related concepts in areas with military bases.
2.1 TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO MILITARIES AND HAZARDS
The number of disasters, costs from damages, and deaths from climate-sensitive
hazards have increased each decade since the 1970s (Smith and Katz, 2013). The military
has played an increasing role in disaster response in the last few decades to assist
overwhelmed local and state authorities. Known as “Defense to Civil Authorities” or
DSCA, military response to hazards typically involves the states activating the National
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Guard and occasionally active-duty troops for larger scale disasters. Local military bases
and communities also sign local mutual aid agreements to assist one another during
emergency response. The military has a plethora of resources on hand to aid local
communities in response, such as high ground clearance vehicles, bulldozers, dump trucks,
tents, cots, medical supplies, as well as doctors, power supply specialists, and soldiers
(FEMA, 2011).
Most of the research on the military’s role in disasters has been in political science,
analyzing the civil-military relations and how state and local agencies work and interact
with the military during disasters. Banks (2006) argues that disaster management in the
United States has become more militarized, especially after Hurricane Katrina, due to the
military’s increased responsibilities in disaster response and FEMA’s placement in the
Department of Homeland Security. Malešič (2015) takes that argument further and urges
caution on the military’s increasing role in DSCA operations and the potential to degrade
the separation of civil-military responsibilities and relations. He and others such as Ferris
(2012) argue that militaries, civilian authorities, and humanitarian agencies should focus
their efforts on planning and coordination in preparing for disasters so that civilian and
military resources are efficient and reach their full potential. Others advocate for a more
robust and flexible response from the military in disasters. Another critique in the military’s
response is that the traditional “respond to request” approach in DSCA operations is too
slow and bureaucratic and should be a more flexible “sense-and-respond” approach, one
that is approached from the bottom up (Embrey et al. 2010).
However, traditional civil-military research has left out how military bases work
with and assist the local community from responding and recovering from disasters.
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Ashcroft and Mason (2006) detailed the recovery of Keesler Air Force Base (AFB) after
Hurricane Katrina. However, they did little to advance the understanding of how Keesler
contributed to or diminished the response and recovery of nearby Biloxi, MS. Trivedi
(2020) mentioned how local military units helped clear debris from schools in Biloxi but
did not identify how Keesler AFB influenced the longer-term recovery of the area or the
existing vulnerability and resiliency in the community. Because of their resources and
funding sources, military bases are some of the first communities to recover after a natural
hazard. They are used as staging grounds for FEMA, the Red Cross, and other government
and non-government organizations (NGOs) (Navy Installations Command, 2021). Other
research aimed at identifying the impacts of military bases on local communities has
focused on the environmental damage and pollution that stems from military bases or left
behind at closed sites (Davis et al., 2007). Economists have studied the impacts of military
base closures through the Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) on local
economies, which occurred after significant disasters in some situations (Hultquiest and
Petras, 2012). There is a gap in research on how local military bases influence all aspects
of the disaster cycle (preparedness, response, recovery, mitigation) in local communities.
One aspect in which this research will address this gap is by advancing the understanding
of how military bases and populations influence the community's underlying social
vulnerability and resiliency to hazards.
2.2 VULNERABILITY TO NATURAL HAZARDS IN MILITARY COMMUNITIES
Vulnerability is a word that holds many different meanings depending on the
context and discipline that is defining, measuring, and assessing it (Wisner, 2016).
Vulnerability to natural hazards has two main dimensions, the human and physical
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dimensions (Fekete and Montz, 2017). Fekete and Montz describe the human dimension
as being composed of susceptibilities and coping and adaptive capacities of people and
social systems to hazards. This research investigates the human dimension of vulnerability,
which is referred to as social vulnerability, and whether military communities possess
unique susceptibilities and coping and adaptive capabilities. .
Social vulnerability to natural hazards is a topic thoroughly studied in recent years
by social scientists. Social vulnerability is a concept that “identifies sensitive populations
that may be less likely to respond to, cope with, and recover from a natural disaster” (Cutter
and Finch, 2008, p. 2301). It is clear from past case studies and literature that hazards
impact people differently, as people have different capacities to adapt from the physical,
economic, and psychological impacts of hazards. Many of these differences have been
identified through the socioeconomic and sociodemographic characteristics in
communities (Cutter, 2003). Some of the characteristics that increase social vulnerability
to hazards are a lack of wealth, dependency on care givers, less educated populations,
renters, temporary and lower wage employment, female headed households, minority
populations such as African American race and Hispanic ethnicity, and many others
(Cutter, 2003).
The sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics are not determinants of
vulnerability, but indicators for potential vulnerability. Hispanic populations, for example,
are vulnerable to hazards because they may not speak English. This reduces their ability to
understand and respond to potential hazards if the information is only delivered in English.
However, this does not indicate that all Hispanic populations are vulnerable or that every
Hispanic person is vulnerable. Some places with a majority of Spanish speakers, such as
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Yuma, AZ, have emergency management programs and information readily available in
English and Spanish. Other places, such as Grand Forks, ND, do not, potentially making
the same information more difficult to access for Spanish speakers. Other characteristics,
such as age (elderly and young children), are dependent on others for care and resources
when responding to natural hazards and is valid across geographies. Many other indicators
of social vulnerability have been identified by researchers (Appendix A).
The demographic characteristics of military families, which are slightly different
from civilian counterparts, also contribute to military communities' social vulnerability.
Military families are slightly more African American and have slightly less Hispanic
ethnicity than the general population (Clever and Segal, 2013). They also have more
educational attainment (at least high school diploma) than the general population due to
enlistment requirements and benefits to service members (ibid.). Clever and Segal (2013)
and Harrel (2000) noted several challenges unique to military families: frequent moves,
prolonged and unpredictable working hours, deployments, and the prevalence of mental
and physical health ailments in veterans. Some of these challenges increase the social
vulnerability in military communities. Frequent moves, for example, lead to higher
percentages of renters in military communities. Renters are considered more socially
vulnerable because they have little control over repairs to damaged properties (Morrow,
1999). An outcome of mental and physical health ailments is homelessness, which is an
indicator for vulnerability. Veteran homelessness has been identified as a growing problem
in the United States, especially in communities with military bases (Villafan, 2016). Others
characteristics in military families decrease their social vulnerability to hazards. These
include higher levels of educational attainment, stable federal employment opportunities,

9

higher incomes of service members, and healthcare availability through Tricare insurance
(Clever and Segal, 2013).
Qualitative studies that identify socially vulnerable characteristics through
interviews, surveys, and field work form the basis for many quantitative social
vulnerability measures. While most case studies with qualitative findings are neither
comparable across geographies nor by hazard type, quantitative measures of vulnerability
can be compared to different places. Quantitative variables are identified and used as
proxies to measure the indicators of vulnerability. Variables that are selected are scaled
using various normalization techniques, such as z-score and linear min-max so that are
relative to each other. The variables are then separated into like factors of vulnerability
using a hierarchical, deductive, or inductive approach (Tate, 2012). Inductive methods
involve using principal component analysis or similar statistical techniques to reduce the
number of variables into factors that explain the most variance in the data. Deductive or
hierarchical methods involve delineating variables into predetermined factors based on the
similarity of the variables (ibid.). Regardless of the method, factors of vulnerability are
then combined using an additive or weighted approach to form a composite index of
vulnerability which can be compared across geographies.
2.3 COMMUNITY RESILIENCE OF MILITARY COMMUNITIES
Resiliency is another term where the meaning and context of the word are often
ambiguous or conflated. Common descriptions of resilience in hazards research and other
fields include bounce-back, absorbing, preparing and planning, recovering from, and
adapting to adverse events (Emrich and Tobin, 2017). Vulnerability and resilience are
sometimes confused as the same concept or opposing concepts, but as shown in Cutter et
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al. (2014) they are not the same. The term resilience in this research is identified more as
absorbing, recovering, and adapting to natural hazards. Vulnerability is viewed more as the
susceptibility to experiencing the negative impacts of natural hazards.
Resilience in communities is composed of the capacity of both individuals and the
greater community to bounce back and forward after disasters. These capacities are
separated into distinct concepts, known as capitals or domains of resilience. Nguyen and
Akerkar (2020) identified six capitals most likely to represent resilience in existing
literature covering the subject. The six capitals they identify are social, physical,
community, individual, economic, and ecological, while other authors replace individual
with others like institutional, and include individual capacities within the social domain
(Cutter, 2014). While the names of the domain may differ, many of the indicators and
characteristics within those domains are the same.
Indicators for resilience within these domains includes both socioeconomic
characteristics such as wealth and income equality, and place based characteristics such as
the transportation access in the community. Other examples of indicators that are within
the six domains of resilience include how prepared and experienced the community is
responding to hazards, the healthcare and hospital capacities relative to the population size,
the political and religious engagement in the community, the diversification of the local
economy, and many others (Cutter et al. 2010). Engagement in community level
organizations, such as religious or civic groups, is identified in several case studies as
increasing resilience (Murphy, 2007). Other studies have shown that a diversified economy
is important for communities, so that if one employer or sector leaves the community, other
sectors and employers are available to meet demand (Adger, 2000). Appendix B identifies

11

other characteristics that were found in case studies to be indicators of resilience and
separates them by domain.
There are unique characteristics in military communities that may influence their
overall resilience. Community capital in military communities is one of the domains that
may be influenced negatively by military populations. Military families are transplants
from other communities in the U.S, which decreases their attachment to places and the
number of networks and connections in the community. Although research has yet to
identify the relationship between military populations and lower levels of resilience at the
community level, studies conducted by psychologists, family life practitioners, and others
in the behavioral sciences have studied the importance of engagement in local communities
at the individual and family level. Mancini et al. (2018) identified a positive relationship
between military families' resilience and the number of connections made to organizations
in local communities outside military installations. Likewise, Huebner et al. (2009)
identified positive impacts to military families that built and maintained relationships in
the community.
Other domains, such as environmental, may have both positive and negative
influences on resilience in military communities. Military bases have large areas of natural
vegetation that are used as training areas for unit training and weapon testing. On one hand,
training areas act as natural buffers and are preserved as undeveloped areas. Undeveloped
areas generally improve the flood capacity of watersheds because the water is absorbed by
the soil and natural vegetation, and wetlands and riparian areas act as buffers. On the other
hand, training areas may have dangerous unexploded ordinance or areas of heavy metal
contamination, which can leach into the water supply (Davis et al. 2007). Military bases
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also store and keep large quantities of fuel, chemicals, and other toxic chemicals that can
spill and negatively impact the environment and community.
Community resilience is measured using similar methods as those mentioned for
social vulnerability. Proxy variables are identified as quantitative measures for capitals of
resilience, and then normalized to like scales. The variables are placed into capitals of
resilience, mostly using a hierarchical or deductive approach, where they attempt to
measure that concept of resilience (economic variables fit into economic capital, for
example). The final composite index is the additive or weighted combination of those
capitals. Community leaders, state level organizations, and others can then use the final
values or the individual capitals to compare the resilience between places, and use it as a
tool to aid in decision making and for allocating resources.
2.4 HAZARDOUSNESS OF MILITARY COMMUNITIES
In the late 1700s and early 1800s, bases were established along the Gulf and
Atlantic coasts to protect ports and cities from bombardment and blockades from foreign
navies (Floyd, 1997). In the 1800s, bases such as Fort Riley, KS and Fort Bliss, TX were
established along transportation corridors in the western frontier and southern border to
protect pioneers and settlers moving into those areas (Doe III, 2010). Further expansion of
bases before and during the World Wars led to the military establishing large military bases
in the West to test new equipment and weaponry, such as tanks and nuclear bombs
(Balbach, 2014). Land in the west was cheap, and small towns sprung up in primarily rural
areas outside of the base to support it. This pattern was replicated throughout the west.
Other bases built or expanded during the World Wars were established in more
populated coastal areas, along intercoastal waterways, and directly on the shoreline and
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barrier islands, such as Coronado Naval Air Station, CA and Eglin Air Force Base, FL.
The coastal locations gave them easy access to ports and the ocean, where they can project
power to other parts of the world. However, bases located in coastal areas leave them in
extremely vulnerable locations to natural hazards, where tidal flooding, storm surge, and
hurricanes cause billions of dollars in damage to military equipment and infrastructure
(NDAA, 2020). Yet, even continental bases experience damage from other hazards like
annual flooding events, wildfires, tornadoes, or severe storms. Significant damage at
military bases in the last three years has occurred from a diverse range of hazards such as
Hurricane Michael, Hurricane Florence, the Platte and Missouri River floods of 2019, the
2018 hailstorms in Colorado, and an EF-3 tornado at Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay
(NOAA, 2019).
Losses from hazards on military bases are not always visible to the public. Only
thorough the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and supplemental
disaster appropriations are military construction spending from hazard damages available
to the public. For example, additional appropriations to the Disaster Relief Act in 2019
allocated over $1.1 billion in military construction to rebuild Tyndall Air Force Base after
Hurricane Michael, and the 2020 NDAA allocated an additional $1.5 billion in military
construction required to rebuild the hangars and facilities that were destroyed (NDAA,
2020). However, hazard losses in the surrounding communities of Bay County, FL and
Panama City are available from public sources, such as the National Weather Service and
U.S. Geological Survey. Other databases, such as the Spatial Hazard Events and Losses
Database in the United States (SHELDUS) aggregates loss data from those sources to form
a more complete picture of the total damages from hazards (CEMHS, 2020).
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Increasing losses and the vulnerability of many coastal military bases to climate
sensitive hazards has not gone unnoticed by military departments in the DoD. The DoD
conducted site specific studies related to infrastructure vulnerability at Naval Base Norfolk,
VA and Coronado Naval Base, CA to sea level rise (SERDP, 2017). However, most of the
research done by the DoD has been hazard specific and focused on the physical
vulnerability of existing infrastructure to hazards. Although this research doesn’t attempt
to replace site specific hazard assessments, it does advocate for a wider approach in
understanding the hazardousness of military communities. This can be accomplished by
incorporating not only the military base but local community. Hazard losses from sources
such as SHELDUS can be combined with indices of vulnerability and resilience to explore
the hazardousness of places (Tate et al. 2010; Emrich and Cutter, 2011; Borden and Cutter,
2008).
2.5 CONCLUSION
Hazard losses, social vulnerability, and resilience are explored to understand the
hazardousness of military communities. Quantitative measures of social vulnerability,
community resilience, and hazard losses in military communities are compared to nonmilitary communities, including the components that create the overall indices of
vulnerability and resilience. The research questions are relatively broad in scope and
approach the problem from the top down. This approach is not an attempt to replace local
hazard assessments in military communities that identify the specific hazard threats and
vulnerabilities in detail. However, this thesis will help bridge the gap in understanding how
military populations and military bases influence local communities' existing vulnerability
and resiliency to hazards, which is missing in existing literature.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA AND METHODOLOGIES
The study area includes all 50 states to account for all hazard types and a vast
geographic extent. Analyses were conducted at the county level to mirror the scale of the
input data. Any level higher than the county, such as the state, does not provide the
necessary detail to perform the analysis required to differentiate between the factors driving
the vulnerability and resiliency of military communities. Any level below the county is
outside the scope of this research and better suited when analyzing smaller geographic
regions, individual states, or when the data is available at those levels. Also, emergency
management and decision makers that influence hazard mitigation funds and other
resources are consolidated at the county level in most areas of the US (Sherrieb et al.,
2010).
3.1 DATA SOURCES
Data were collected from four sources, including the Department of Defense
(DoD), the United States Census Bureau, the Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute
at the University of South Carolina (HVRI), and the Center of Emergency Management
and Homeland Security at Arizona State University (CEMHS). Military installation,
ranges, and training areas (MIRTA) shapefiles were downloaded from the US Army Corps
of Engineers data repository available to the public (DoD, 2017). The 2020 MIRTA dataset
includes the name of the military base, the service branch (Army, Navy, Air Force, etc.),
the bases’ status (active, reserve, national guard), and the spatial boundary. County
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boundary shapefiles were downloaded from the United States Census Bureau and provided
the basis for joining non-spatial data into the GIS interface (Census, 2020). Data tables for
military employment and insurance data were also downloaded from the US Census, which
is expanded on in the following section.
The Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) is used as the measure of social vulnerability
and was downloaded from HVRI. While many indices exist to measure the concept,
including a freely available social vulnerability index (SVI) from the Center for Disease
Control, SoVI is one of the most widely cited and used social vulnerability index in
academia, state governments, non-profits and NGOs, and even the federal government.
SoVI also performed better than SVI in attempts to validate the indices using disaster
outcomes (Rufat et al., 2019) and SoVI displayed reliable results at different scales through
sensitivity analysis (Schmidtlein et al. 2008). The Corps of Engineers uses SoVI methods
to identify environmental justice impacts for flood control projects and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has adopted SoVI in their recent Hazard Risk
Index tool (Dunning and Durden, 2011; FEMA, 2020).
Using principal component analysis, SoVI reduces an extensive range of
socioeconomic variables known to influence the vulnerability of places into eight factors
that explain the most variance in the data (Cutter et al. 2003). The SoVI used in this analysis
was not calculated by the author but used with permission from HVRI, which was
composed using the 2014-2018 ACS 5-year estimate. The eight factors of social
vulnerability in the dataset are race (African American and social status), wealth (low), age
dependence, ethnicity (Hispanic and education), special needs populations, race (Native
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American), service sector employment, and gender (Female). Cutter et al. (2003) describes
the framework behind SoVI and a more detailed description of how the index is calculated.
Similar to social vulnerability, many indices exist that attempt to measure
community resilience. The Baseline Resilience Indicators for Communities (BRIC) is used
in this research because it is one of the few indices available for all 3,143 counties in the
US and was developed using a multi-hazard approach (Ostadtaghizadeh, 2015). BRIC is
also widely used in the hazards and emergency management community, evidenced from
its inclusion in the National Risk Index with SoVI (FEMA, 2020).
BRIC follows a different approach than SoVI’s inductive method using principal
component analysis. BRIC uses a deductive approach that starts with six capitals
representing the different types of resilience in communities. Forty-nine total variables
were identified and then placed into their six corresponding capitals of resilience based on
expert knowledge and previous literature (Cutter et al., 2014). Each capital of resilience
has a theoretical range of 0-1, and then added together to create a composite index with a
theoretical range of 0-6. The six capitals of resilience in BRIC are social, economic,
institutional, infrastructural, environmental, and community capital. BRIC capital values
and overall scores were downloaded with permission by HVRI and compiled using various
data sources collected from 2010-2016.
Hazard loss data was obtained from SHELDUS, which is maintained by the
CEMHS at Arizona State University (CEMHS, 2020). Data was downloaded for all
counties in the U.S. from the years 1960-2018, and for all hazards. SHELDUS includes
hazard loss data for crop and property losses from 17 different hazards types, including
meteorological events such as drought and hail, and geophysical events such as earthquakes
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and tsunamis. Crop and property losses were adjusted for inflation into 2018 dollars and
standardized per capita using 2018 population totals for each county from SHELDUS.
Likewise, losses were standardized per capita so that values could be compared between
less populated rural areas and more populated urban areas. Property and crop losses were
then summed to get total hazard losses per capita from 1960-2018.
SHELDUS does have limitations, such as only providing direct losses from natural
hazards and not indirect losses, such as decreased economic activity (Hahn, 2017). Scale
is another limitation of SHELDUS, which aggregates data to the county level, making it
difficult to understand the hazard exposure at the local level (Emrich and Cutter, 2011).
Despite these limitations, however, SHELDUS presents the best available database for
natural hazard losses in the United States due to its complete coverage of the United States
and long record of loss data going back to 1960. Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics
on hazard losses, SoVI values, and BRIC values used in the analysis.
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics for Hazard Losses, SoVI, and BRIC (n = 3,143 counties)
Total Damages
SoVI Score
BRIC Score
Per Capita
Mean
$11,354
0
2.729
Median

$3,877

.03

2.733

Std. Deviation

$34,676

2.89

.147

$1,248,308

25.6

1.174

Kurtosis

563

2.12

.335

Skewness
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Test for Normality

18.9

.367

-.283

Range

Fail (p = .000)

Fail (p = .000)

Fail (p = .000)

3.2 DEFINING MILITARY COMMUNITIES
In this research, the term community is synonymous with a county. Although a
community is more likely to be used colloquially as a neighborhood or smaller census unit
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such as census tract, the term is used more broadly in this research to describe places
significantly influenced by military installations and military populations. This is primarily
due to the level of analysis conducted at the county level and because military installations
are often large and cross county boundaries. Military members and families are not
constrained to only living on the military base and work, live, and go to school in the
community. The military community is also sometimes used to describe the people that are
in the military or their family members (DoD, 2019b). However, here it is referenced as a
place, which includes the people in the military, civilians, the organizations, networks, and
all other components and relationships that make up a community. Two census variables,
using the 2014-2018 5-year American Community Survey estimates, are used in
combination as a proxy to identify military communities, as well as the Military
Installation, Ranges, and Training Areas (MIRTA) shapefile from the Department of
Defense (U.S. Census, 2019; DoD, 2017). The number of people with Tricare Insurance
(table C27008) and the number of people with military employment (table B23001) is used
as a pass or fail screen to identify potential military communities. The MIRTA shapefile
was used as a final screen to ensure only counties near an active military base were
considered military communities.
Tricare Insurance is the insurance program for the military and their family
members. Eligibility for Tricare extends to the national guard, reserves, military retirees
(20+ years of service), and Coast Guard. The additional dataset of active-duty employment
helped pinpoint communities with a significant military presence rather than places with
reservists only, for example. Tricare insurance and military employment variables were
normalized as a percent of the population. The distribution of the percent of the US
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population with Tricare insurance or active-duty employment was highly skewed, with
most counties having only a small percentage of people with those characteristics. Again,
this paper defined military communities as counties with significant influence by military
populations and bases, which prior research has not identified. Therefore, a subjective
determination for thresholds in Tricare insurance and military employment data was made
after close inspection of the descriptive statistics, distribution, research into individual
counties, and the author's best judgment based on experience.
Table 3.2 displays the descriptive statistics for the variables used to identify military
communities, the cutoff criteria, and the purpose of the variable. Counties with more than
4.5% of the population with Tricare insurance and 1.5% of the population with military
employment were determined to be considered military communities. The ratio of Tricare
to military employment equates to a 3:1 ratio, which is close to the 2:1 ratio of military
family members to active-duty soldiers in the U.S (DoD, 2019b). The additional unit
accounts for other populations eligible for Tricare and live in military communities
(retirees, reservists). Lastly, counties without an active-duty military base or were not
adjacent to a county with an active base were screened out using GIS. The geographic
criteria helped identify only counties near an active-duty military base, where their
influence is more significant. The geospatial criteria screened out five counties. Two of the
five had Coast Guard bases (Kodiak Island, AK and Pasquotank County, NC), two were
rural counties tangentially influenced by Fort Riley (Clay and Pottawatomie Counties, KS),
and one was a reserve base outside of New Orleans (Plaquemines Parish, LA).
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Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics and criteria for classifying military communities.
Military
SkewVariable
Mean Median
Community
Purpose
ness
Criteria/Cut-off
Identify people
connected to military
% Tricare
~ 90th percentile service (includes military
2.88
2.13
6.23
Insurance
(4.5%)
dependents, retirees,
reserves, national guard
and coast guard)
% Active
~ 95th percentile
Identify active duty
Military
.287
.033
17.5
(1.5%)
service members
Employment
County contains
Identify counties that are
an active military
geographically
Location of
base or is
influenced by an active
Military
adjacent to a
military base (screen out
Base
county that
Reservist, National
contains an
Guard, Retiree, etc.)
active base
Upon close inspection of the counties that passed all thresholds, the criteria did well
in representing the 106 communities heavily influenced by military bases and populations.
This was determined based on the author’s personal knowledge and expert judgment of
military installations and communities. Among some of the more notable counties
classified as military were large counties like San Diego, CA and Honolulu, HI, mediumsized counties of El Paso, TX and El Paso, CO, and smaller counties and independent cities
such as Petersburg, VA, and Alexandria, VA. Bexar County, TX, which is often thought
of as a military community, was screened out. Bexar County, Texas is home to Joint Base
San Antonio, which has several military facilities in the county. However, military
members are a small percentage of the overall population (1.07% military employment)
compared to other large counties like San Diego, California (2.76% military employment).
Counties that met all three criteria were classified as military communities (N=106), while
the remaining 3,037 were classified as non-military communities. Figure 3.1 displays the
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counties classified as military and non-military, with clusters in the Hampton Roads region
of Virginia, the South, and a smaller number of counties scattered throughout the West and
Midwest.

Figure 3.1: Military Communities in the United States differentiated by service branch
(non-military communities in beige color).
To answer the second part of the research questions, the type of military base in the
community was identified and classified either as Army, Air Force, Navy, or Joint. Joint
communities were those with a combination of military installations belonging to multiple
branches of the military. For example, El Paso County, CO, was defined as a Joint
community because it is home to Fort Carson (Army) and several Air Force Bases (AFB)
such as Peterson AFB and Schriever AFB. Communities with only one type of military
base were classified under that type of base. Marine Corps bases were classified as Navy
due to being under the Department of the Navy's jurisdiction, and Space Force garrisons
are classified as Air Force. As a result, 13 communities were classified as Joint, 28 as Navy,
31 as Air Force, and 34 as Army.
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3.3 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
A variety of statistical tests, spatial statistics, and mapping techniques answer the
research questions and determine differences between hazard losses, SoVI, and BRIC in
military and non-military communities. Hazard losses were normalized on a per capita
basis to account for urban and rural differences and adjusted into 2018 dollars to account
for inflation over time. Property and crop losses were summed for all counties during the
59 years of 1960-2018 to get the total damages used in the analysis. Although the number
of service members and the overall population in military communities have changed over
time, the complete dataset in SHELDUS (59 years) was used to capture as many hazard
events as possible so as to not skew data towards more recent events.
All three variables of total hazard losses, SoVI, and BRIC exhibited non-normal
properties and failed the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality (Table 3.2). Due to
failing the normality assumption and the significant difference in the number of nonmilitary communities and military communities, non-parametric statistical tests were
conducted. The Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to identify significant differences
between the mean ranks of the three variables (Hazard losses, SoVI, BRIC) in military and
non-military communities. The Mann-Whitney U test ranks all communities from 1 to
3,143 based on the value of the variable, and determines statistical significance between
those ranks. The community with the lowest total hazard losses per capita would rank as
1, while the community with the highest losses ranks as 3,143, for example. This negates
the influence of extreme outliers on the mean values and other non-normal characteristics
in the data. The Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to understand the differences in the
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variables by type of military community (Army, Air Force, Navy). This method also tested
differences in the mean ranks of the variables.
Next, the factors of SoVI and BRIC capitals were analyzed further using binary
logistic regression (between military and non-military communities) and multinomial
logistic regression (between types of military communities). The choice of binary logistic
regression was similar to Cutter et al. (2016), which explored the capitals of BRIC between
rural and urban communities. The beta coefficient, Wald statistic, and odds ratio for each
of the significant contributing variables in the models determined the driving factors in
differences of social vulnerability and resilience between military and non-military
communities. Before conducting the logistic regression analysis, however, SoVI factors
and BRIC capitals were standardized using z-scores to account for any outliers that may
influence the model. Also, to account for the large disparity in the number of communities
in each category, 106 military and 3,037 non-military, a random sample of 106 nonmilitary communities was taken before conducting the regression models1. Additionally, a
random sample of 28 Army and 28 Air Force communities was taken to account for sample
size differences before conducting the multinomial regression model (only 28 Navy
communities in the dataset). All statistical analyses were completed using SPSS Version
26 (IBM Corp, 2020).

1

Binary logistic regression models did poorly when all counties were included in the
model. Therefore, a random sample of 106 non-military counties were selected in the
regression analysis. To remain consistent, 28 Army and Air Force counties were
randomly selected so that the number of counties for each category (Army, Air Force,
Navy) were the same.
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3.4 SPATIAL ANALYSIS
To fully understand the significant differences and drivers of social vulnerability
and community resilience in military communities, the community's location must also be
considered. Social vulnerability and community resilience in the United States have high
and significant levels of spatial autocorrelation (p = .000) with distinct clusters in some
areas of the United States. Spatial autocorrelation violates the assumption that observations
in the data are independent of one another, which was not addressed in the logit models
directly. Therefore, Anselin Local Moran’s I was employed as a form of sensitivity analysis
to determine if the logit models' results were due to the community's location and existing
geographic trends or were unique to military communities irrespective of location. Anselin
Local Moran’s I is a technique used to identify statistically significant outliers in
geographic clusters of areas with high or low values (Anselin, 1995). It is a local indicator
of spatial association (LISA statistic) and provides four outputs, clusters of high values,
clusters of low values, high-value outliers in low clusters, and low-value outliers in high
clusters (ESRI, 2020). Communities that do not exhibit the same values as those around
them were reported as statistically significant outliers, which was essential in
understanding the differences between places. Special attention was given to military
communities identified as outliers to describe and analyze any patterns in the results.
Hawaii and Alaska were excluded from the spatial analysis because of the contiguity
requirement in using the county boundary polygons. Spatial statistics and maps used ESRI
Arc Map 10.7.
In addition to mapping and evaluating outliers, the binary and multinomial
regression models' residuals were visually inspected for spatial patterns. Visual inspection
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instead of spatial statistics was performed because the binary and multinomial models only
included 212 and 84 counties, respectively. Visual inspection of the residuals further
helped understand the driving factors in vulnerability and resiliency, where communities
with high residuals were those that the regression models had trouble in classifying
correctly, indicating different influencing variables. The perspective given through the
spatial analysis, combined with the statistical evidence and hazard loss data, enabled a
better understanding of the threat and risk that hazards place on those communities. Results
are presented in four parts; first identifying the differences between military and nonmilitary communities, then analyzing only military communities by type, next by analyzing
hazard losses combined with the underlying conditions in places, and finally, a summary
of the results.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
The first half of the results section identifies differences between military
communities and non-military communities, while the second half identifies differences in
military communities based on the type of military base in the community. In both
comparisons, results from descriptive and inferential statistics are presented first, followed
by the spatial statistics. Lastly, hazard losses in military communities are explored in more
detail, and put into context with the results from analyzing social vulnerability and
community resiliency.
4.1 COMPARING MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY COMMUNITIES
Differences in the levels of hazard losses and social vulnerability between military
and non-military communities in the United States were found to be statistically significant.
Although there were differences in community resilience levels, those differences were not
significant based on the Mann-Whitney U test. Table 4.1 displays the mean values, mean
ranks, the standardized test statistic, and p-value when tested at the 95% confidence level.
Hazard losses and social vulnerability were significantly lower in military communities
than in non-military communities, and resiliency was higher in military communities.
However, the difference in resiliency was not statistically significant. The composite SoVI
scores need to be unpacked and analyzed further through statistical and spatial analysis to
understand why military communities were less socially vulnerable.
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Table 4.1. Comparing Military and Non-Military Communities
Community
Standardized
Mean
Mean Rank
Type
U Statistic*
Total
Military
$6,740
1,198
Hazard
-3.443
Non-Military
$11,515
1,584
Losses
Military
-1.295
1,158
SoVI
-4.767
Non-Military
0.045
1,585
BRIC

Military
Non-Military

2.738
2.729

1,652
1,568

.938

p-value
.000
.000
.350

*Negative sign direction indicates association with military communities; n = 106 for
military communities and 3,037 for non-military communities
4.2 DIFFERENCES IN SOVI FACTORS BETWEEN MILITARY AND NONMILITARY COMMUNITIES
Through binary logistic regression, social vulnerability factors that associate more
with military communities than non-military communities were identified to help
understand the drivers behind their lower SoVI scores. Again, the eight factors that
comprised the social vulnerability index were wealth (low), race (African American) and
social status, age (elderly), ethnicity (Hispanic) and lack of health insurance, special needs
populations, service sector employment, race (Native American), and gender (Female).
The logit model was statistically significant (𝜒 ! (8) = 120, p =.000) and t Table 4.2
displays the beta coefficient (B), Wald statistic, significance levels, and odds ratios for each
variable in the model. Age and special needs factors stand out in explaining the differences
between military communities and non-military communities.
In logistic regression, the odds ratio was interpreted as the number of times more
likely to be associated with a category (dependent variable) considering a one-unit increase
in the factor (independent variable) (Bewick et al., 2005). Therefore, after interpreting the
results, communities were 6 and 7 times more likely to classify as non-military with every
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one-unit increase in the age and special needs factor scores, respectively. Military
communities had a lower median age and fewer social security beneficiaries, which were
variables in the age factor. Likewise, non-military communities had a larger percent of
nursing home residents and hospitals per capita (special needs factor). Communities were
also one and a half times more likely to classify as non-military with a one-unit increase in
wealth (low). Military communities had higher amounts of wealth than non-military
communities, and some of the variables included in this factor were median income,
median home value, and median rent.
Other variables that significantly contributed to the model were service sector
employment and race (African American and social status). These factors were two times
more likely to be associated with military communities considering a one-unit increase in
the factor scores. Variables in these factors included service sector employment and female
participation in the workforce (service sector), and African American and female-headed
households (race and social status). Ethnicity (Hispanic), race (Native American), and
gender (female) were not significant contributors to the model.
Table 4.2 Binary logistic regression results with factors of SoVI presented in descending
order based on the Wald statistic.
Wald
Odds
Likely category with
SoVI Factor
B
p-value
𝟐
ratio
one unit increase
𝝌
Age
-1.80
40.94
.000
6.02*
Non-military
Special Needs

-1.98

18.89

.000

7.25*

Non-military

Wealth (low)
Service Sector
Employ.
Race (African Am.
and Social Status)
Ethnicity (Hispanic)
Race (Native
American)
Gender (Female)

-0.50

12.68

.000

1.65*

Non-military

0.88

10.86

.001

2.40

Military

0.70

8.13

.004

2.03

Military

-0.26

1.73

.189

1.25*

Non-military

0.20

0.53

.466

1.22

Military

0.08

0.13

.723

1.08

Military
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*Inverted Odds Ratios; Negative Beta coefficients denote associations with non-military
communities, positive coefficients denote associations with military communities.
When the communities classified incorrectly by the model (high residuals) were
examined, the driving factors of social vulnerability in military communities was further
highlighted. Higher age vulnerability and lower race (African American and social status)
vulnerability were noticed in the 17 military communities that the model incorrectly
classified as non-military. The three counties with the highest residuals were military
communities with large populations of retirees (high age factor score). Monroe County,
FL, Moore County, NC, and Beaufort County, SC are prominent retirement communities
(Florida Keys, Pinehurst, and Hilton Head, respectively) and have military bases in the
counties. Other counties with high residuals had a lower race and social status factor score
and are located in the upper Great Plains and Alaska. These counties were Meade County,
SD, Ward County, ND, and Southeast Fairbanks, AK. No other spatial trends were visually
identified in the residuals. Counties with high residuals highlight that not all military
communities are alike and that broad, generalized observations should be used with
caution.
The driving factors of social vulnerability in military communities were quite
consistent, especially in communities dominated by military employment (Table 4.3).
Chattahoochee County, GA, Pulaski County, MO, Onslow County, NC, Geary County,
KS, and Christian County, KY all have the highest percentages of military employment in
the United States and service sector employment is the leading factor of social vulnerability
in each of those counties. Service sector employment was high because military bases
generate and require many service sector positions such as teachers, nurses, maintenance,
cashiers, and human resource professionals, to name a few. They also generate service
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positions outside the base that cater to military members and families, such as retail and
banking. Military spouses also fill these positions, increasing female participation in the
workforce which further increases service sector employment factor scores. However,
communities dominated by military employment have relatively lower overall SoVI scores
than other communities in the United States, driven by low age and gender factor scores.
Small changes to the military bases in these communities, whether from troop level
reductions or damages and impacts from natural hazards, are likely to have outsized
negative impacts in the community due to their reliance on military spending and lower
wage and hourly service sector opportunities.
Table 4.3. Counties with highest percent military employment and their SoVI factor scores.
Percent
SoVI Factors*
County
Military
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Employ.
Chattahoo52
0.40 -0.58 -3.53 -0.86 1.11 0.12 1.46 -6.21
chee, GA
Pulaski, MO
28
-0.49 0.16 -2.22 -0.40 -0.14 0.20 1.87 -3.07
Onslow, NC
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-0.18

0.03

-1.99

-0.55

-0.29

0.07

1.94

-2.20

Geary, KS
Christian,
KY
Vernon
Parish, LA
Coryell, TX
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-0.28

-0.26

-1.98

-0.20

0.58

0.20

2.72

-1.30

14

0.61

0.18

-1.62

-0.33

0.56

0.07

1.62

-1.21

14

0.28

-0.03

-1.31

-0.29

0.19

0.22

0.43

-1.86

14

-0.12

0.42

-1.84

0.07

-0.70

-0.20

1.53

-0.62

Norfolk, VA

12

1.58

-1.04

-1.80

-0.41

0.75

0.30

1.45

-0.71

Liberty, GA

12

1.26

-0.35

-1.59

-0.21

0.17

0.24

1.39

-0.58

Elmore, ID
12
-0.56 0.11 -0.97 0.40 -0.18 0.48 0.38 -0.97
*Factor 1 = Race (African American and Social Status); Factor 2 = Wealth (low); Factor
3 = Age; Factor 4 = Ethnicity (Hispanic); Factor 5 = Special Needs Populations; Factor 6
= Race (Native American); Factor 7 = Service Sector Employment; Factor 8 = Gender
(female).
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4.3 SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL VULNERABILITY IN MILITARY
COMMUNITIES
ArcMap 10.7 was used to identify clusters of high and low SoVI values, as well as
associated outliers using Anselin Local Moran’s I. Outliers, were important to identify
because they denote reversals in geographic trends. Suppose military communities are
consistently among outliers in high-value clusters located throughout the US. In that case,
it can be assumed that characteristics unique to military communities drive the lower values
in those clusters rather than prevailing demographic and socio-economic trends of the area.
High-value clusters of social vulnerability were found in the Great Plains stretching
south into Texas, as far west as Arizona, and as far east as Mississippi (Figure 4.1). Pockets
of high social vulnerability clusters appeared in small areas of the Carolinas and South
Florida. Among the ten military communities with the highest SoVI values, seven were in
Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico, and no military communities in those states were low
SoVI outliers. Hispanic ethnicity and service sector employment were the two leading
factors in all seven of those communities (El Paso, Val Verde, and Kleberg Counties in
Texas, Yuma and Cochise Counties in Arizona, and Roosevelt and Curry Counties in New
Mexico). Although military communities have lower SoVI values overall, only 4 of the 18
(22%) military communities located in high-value clusters were low-value outliers. Those
communities were Meade County, SD, Lonoke County, AR, Bossier Parish, LA, and
Onslow County, NC. The four counties all have high percentages of the population using
Tricare Insurance (greater than 10%), but were not spatially concentrated in any area.
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Figure 4.1: Anselin Local Moran’s I output of SoVI values (military communities in dark
outline).
Low-value clusters of SoVI were located in the Mountain West and the Northeast
stretching into the Midwest. Nine out of the ten military communities with the lowest SoVI
values were located in low-value clusters. These communities generally have low age,
wealth, and service sector employment vulnerabilities compared to other military
communities. Interestingly, 5 of 28 (18%) military communities in low SoVI clusters were
outliers of high social vulnerability and geographically clustered in southeast Virginia. The
high number of outliers was an unexpected result, given that military communities have
lower SoVI scores than others. These five outliers of high social vulnerability were located
in the Hampton Roads region and nearby Petersburg, VA. In this area of Virginia, counties
are smaller in size and often operate as independent cities. The differences in social
vulnerability levels between communities that are close in geography are notable and stark.
The five communities of Petersburg, Newport News, Hampton, Norfolk, and Portsmouth
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have significantly lower social vulnerability than their six neighboring military
communities (Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2: SoVI by county in the Hampton Roads region of Virginia (military
communities in dark outline).
North of the Hampton Roads (water feature) is Poquoson, York, Hampton, and
Newport News. These communities are Joint communities, as there is a combination of
Army, Air Force, and Navy bases nearby. Poquoson and York are primarily non-Hispanic
white and wealthy communities with military bases located within their borders. These
communities are suburban and have low overall social vulnerability. However, Hampton
and Newport News, also containing military bases, have higher levels in the race and social
status and service sector employment factors that subsequently result in higher SoVI
values. South of Hampton Roads is Norfolk, Portsmouth, Chesapeake, Suffolk, and
Virginia Beach, which surround the large naval bases of Norfolk and Air Station Oceana.
Similar to the contrast on the northside of Hampton Roads, Norfolk and Portsmouth's
denser cities have higher social vulnerability levels driven by race and social status
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vulnerability. The adjacent suburb communities of Chesapeake, Suffolk, and Virginia
Beach are majority non-Hispanic white and wealthier communities, with lower social
vulnerability levels.
Similar contrasts in local geographies of SoVI appear in Petersburg, VA, located
outside the main entrance to Fort Lee. Petersburg has the highest SoVI score of all military
communities of 7.75, driven by race and social status and service sector employment.
Neighboring Prince George County has a SoVI score of -6.33. The range in SoVI values
between Prince George County and Petersburg, VA is one of the largest between two
neighboring communities in the United States. Therefore, it is a false assumption that
military bases reduce social vulnerability in all military communities or do so equally.
Communities within the Hampton Roads region and around Petersburg, VA show stark
contrasts in their social vulnerability levels, explainable in part by other institutional and
economic influences and inequities not captured in SoVI.
The logit model's significant contributing factors of SoVI were also mapped
through Anselin Local Moran’s I cluster analysis. Increases in the age factor, with variables
median age, social security recipients, and age dependency (elderly and young children),
were more likely to be associated with non-military communities in the logit model. Age
has high clusters in Appalachia, South Florida, Texas, and South Florida (Figure 4.3). 11
out of the 12 (92%) military communities in high age clusters were low outliers, compared
to only 44% of non-military communities that were outliers. This adds to the logistic
regression finding that age vulnerability is significantly lower in military communities,
even when considering location. The one county that was not an outlier in high age clusters
was Monroe County, FL, identified earlier as a popular retiree destination. Only one out of
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the 19 (5%) military communities in low age clusters were high-value outliers, compared
to the 36% of non-military communities that were outliers. This further supports the result
of military communities having uniquely lower age vulnerability.

Figure 4.3: Age Factor clusters of social vulnerability (military communities in dark
outline).
Service sector employment was another significant factor in the logit model, where
higher levels occurred in military communities. High values of service sector employment
clustered in the Northeast through the Midwest and the West Coast, while low-value
clusters wered found in the Southeast, northern Great Plains, Mountain West (Figure 4.4).
In low service sector employment clusters, 35 out of 51 (69%) military communities were
high-value outliers compared to only 48% of non-military communities identified as
outliers. Conversely, only 10 out of the 38 (26%) military communities in high service
sector employment clusters were low-value outliers, compared to 46% of non-military
communities that were outliers. The ten low-value outliers in military communities were
clustered in the greater D.C. metropolitan area and wealthier suburbs of the Hampton
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Roads region, where high-paying wages and more diverse economies exist. The higher
percentage of high-value outliers and the smaller percentage of low-value outliers
demonstrates that service sector employment is generally higher in military communities,
except in the national capital region (NCR), home to the defense industrial complex. The
Pentagon, Fort Belvoir, Fort Myer, Marine Corps Base Quantico, and others in the NCR
mainly function at the government's strategic level and are staffed by high-ranking officers
and senior enlisted non-commissioned officers. Officers have much higher incomes than
lower enlisted soldiers, who are more numerous at other military bases outside of the NCR.
The high-paying jobs available in the defense industrial complex and demographic makeup
of the military communities in the area demonstrated that military communities were not
homogeneous and possess different vulnerabilities.

Figure 4.4: Service Sector Factor Clusters (military communities in dark outline).
With variables such as nursing home residents and the number of hospitals per
capita, the special needs factor had high-value clusters in the Great Plains stretching down
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to the Texas Panhandle and West Texas. Clusters of low special needs populations exist in
Appalachia, the southwest, and the Pacific Northwest. Only a few outliers were found in
military communities as they generally followed the prevailing geographic trend as the
communities around them. Few outliers indicate that geographic location may influence
the special needs vulnerability more than the military populations and bases themselves.
There are also not as many military communities located in the Great Plains, where there
are high-value clusters of special needs vulnerability. Other regions have more military
communities, such as the South, which have low-value special needs clusters.
The race (African American and social status) factor mostly followed existing
geographic clusters as well, with only a few outliers in both high and low-value clusters.
As expected, military communities in the South and Mid-Atlantic had higher levels of race
and social status vulnerability than military communities in other regions. Low race and
social status clusters were found in the Midwest, Great Plains, and Northwest, where there
are fewer military communities. There were no military communities identified as outliers
in clusters for the wealth factor of social vulnerability, which followed existing geographic
patterns. Military communities located in clusters of high wealth, such as in the D.C.
metropolitan area, exhibited similar levels of wealth as the neighboring communities in
those clusters. There were also fewer and smaller clusters of both high and low wealth
throughout the United States.
4.4 DIFFERENCES IN CAPITALS OF BRIC BETWEEN MILITARY AND NONMILITARY COMMUNITIES
Although no significant differences in community resilience levels between
military and non-military communities were identified (p = .350), binary logistic regression
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was conducted to highlight the most influential capitals of resilience in military
communities compared to non-military communities. The six capitals of resilience that
comprise BRIC are community, social, institutional, infrastructural, economic, and
environmental. Again, each capital was standardized by z-scores before the regression
analysis. The same random sample of the 212 communities (106 military and 106 nonmilitary) used in the SoVI regression was used in the BRIC regression to remain consistent.
As expected, the results of the BRIC logistic regression were not as strong as the SoVI
factors but was statistically significant (𝜒 ! (5) = 74.2, p =.000).
As shown in Table 4.4, three of the six capitals of BRIC significantly contributed
to the model. They were community capital, social capital, and environmental capital.
Environmental resilience was expected as it includes the variables percent of land in
wetlands, average surface perviousness, and food access. Most military communities have
large natural areas where the ground is pervious due to undeveloped training areas on
military bases, and many are in rural counties. With a one-unit increase in social resilience
values, communities were two times more likely to classify as military communities. This
could be due to the military service requirement of receiving a high school diploma and
benefits such as health insurance coverage, which are some of the social capital variables.
A one-unit increase in community capital, which has variables like voting participation and
percent of residents born in other states, was 3.76 times more likely to classify a community
as non-military. This is likely due to the frequent moves of military members leading to
lower levels of place attachment.
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Table 4.4. Binary logistic regression results with capitals of BRIC in descending order
based on the Wald statistic.
Wald
Likely category with
BRIC Capital
B
p-value Odds ratio
one unit increase
𝝌𝟐
Community
-1.32
37.08
.000
3.76*
Non-military
Social

0.76

10.44

.001

2.13

Military

Environmental

0.36

4.06

.044

1.43

Military

Institutional

0.33

3.09

.079

1.39

Military

Infrastructural

0.29

1.96

.162

1.33

Military

Economic
.015
*Inverted odds-ratio

0.47

.492

1.16

Military

Military communities with high residuals that were incorrectly classified by the
model included higher levels of community capital, lower levels of social capital, and more
urban communities with lower environmental capital levels. The urban counties of
Honolulu, HI and Petersburg, VA, had some of the lowest environmental capital levels in
the sample and were incorrectly classified as non-military by the model. Petersburg, VA,
Kleberg County, TX, and Cochise County, AZ all had the lowest social capital levels
among military communities. In contrast, Sumter County, SC and Hardin County, KY have
high levels of social capital. No spatial pattern existed in the residuals, as high and low
residuals were in various parts of the country. Looking again at the most militarydominated counties in the U.S., it is clear that lower levels of community capital drive
lower overall community resilience in those places (Table 4.5). This finding is similar to
those of Cutter and Derakhshan (2020), who identified low community capital as the driver
in the least resilient communities in the U.S
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Table 4.5. Z-scores of BRIC capitals in the most concentrated military communities.
Percent
EconInfrast- Comm- Institut- EnviroCounty
Military
Social
omic
ructural
unity
ional
nmental
Employ.
Chattahoo52
-0.34
-1.99
0.35
-3.28
-0.52
-0.33
chee, GA
Pulaski, MO
28
0.69
-0.16
-1.42
-1.02
-0.56
-0.28
Onslow, NC

25

0.58

-0.48

-0.03

-0.85

1.19

1.19

Geary, KS
Christian,
KY
Vernon
Parish, LA
Coryell, TX

22

1.20

0.54

0.90

-0.03

0.70

-0.16

14

0.71

-0.28

0.05

-0.14

0.19

-0.48

14

0.75

-0.61

-0.86

-0.14

1.73

-0.26

14

0.34

-0.66

-0.39

-1.21

-0.15

-0.05

Norfolk, VA

12

-0.05

0.28

1.69

-0.83

0.24

-1.88

Liberty, GA

12

1.00

0.25

-0.58

-0.04

-0.34

1.52

Elmore, ID

12

0.15

0.02

0.03

-1.42

-0.68

-0.29

4.5 SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY RESILIENCY OF MILITARY
COMMUNITIES
Significant clusters of high BRIC scores existed in the upper Great Plains, New
England, and southern Louisiana (Figure 4.5). Low BRIC clusters were located throughout
the western states, primarily in the southwest and into southern Texas. Smaller clusters of
low BRIC existed in pockets of the southeast, including Appalachia and Florida. Only one
of seven (14%) military communities located in high BRIC clusters was a low outlier,
which was Riley County, Kansas, home to Fort Riley and Kansas State University. Out of
the 21 military communities located in low BRIC clusters, 7 were high-value outliers
(33%). The outliers were expected, as BRIC values are higher in military communities.
The seven outliers of high BRIC values were located in the southeast and central Texas,
and no outliers were located in the southwest.
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Figure 4.5: Anselin Moran’s I output for BRIC clusters (military communities in dark
outline).
Community capital was the most influential component of BRIC in the logit model,
and higher values were more likely to be associated with non-military communities. Low
values of community capital clustered along the West Coast, Southwest, Florida, and others
(Figure 4.6). Out of the 33 military communities located in low-value clusters, zero were
high-value outliers, while 16% of all non-military communities in low community capital
clusters were high-value outliers. This indicated that lower community capital was a trait
consistent across military communities. In addition, 8 out of 13 (62%) military
communities in high-value clusters were identified as low-value outliers, compared to only
16% of non-military communities. The spatial analysis findings add to the logit model
results that identified community capital was uniquely lower in military communities,
regardless of prevailing geographic trends.
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Figure 4.6: Community Capital Clusters (military communities in dark outline).
Social capital, the next most influential variable in the model, had high-value
clusters in the Northeast, Midwest, and the Great Salt Lake region (Figure 4.7). Out of the
16 military communities located in clusters of high social capital, zero were low outliers,
compared to 5% of non-military communities. Low values of social capital were clustered
primarily in the southern U.S., including Florida, south Texas, and the Mississippi River
valley. In those areas, 5 out of 13 (38%) military communities were identified as highvalue outliers, compared to only 17% of non-military communities. The individual
variables in social capital were sociodemographic and economic characteristics such as
educational equity, transportation access, food access, and health coverage. Many social
capital variables are high in military communities due to enlistment requirements and
benefits provided to service members and their families.
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Figure 4.7: Social Capital Clusters (military communities in dark outline).
No significant patterns or outliers emerged from the LISA statistic in environmental
capital. Only a few small clusters of high values existed along the coastline (wetlands) and
low values in urban areas (perviousness). After conducting the statistical and spatial
analysis of the differences between military and non-military communities in resiliency,
military communities had uniquely lower levels of community capital than non-military
communities, regardless of geographic location. Social capital was higher in military
communities but is not as strong as the influence of community capital.
4.6

COMPARING

WITHIN

MILITARY

COMMUNITIES

BY

MILITARY

DEPARTMENT
In addition to identifying differences between military and non-military
communities, it is also beneficial to identify differences within military communities, using
the service branch represented by the base. This type of analysis helps leaders in the DoD
and state and federal governments identify any differences in Army, Air Force, or Navy
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communities' underlying conditions. Non-parametric tests examined any differences, this
time using the Kruskal-Wallis test and multinomial logistic regression. Table 4.6 displays
the Kruskal-Wallis test results against the mean ranks of the 93 military communities in
the dataset. The 13 Joint communities with multiple types of bases were not included.
Significant differences were found in hazard losses and social vulnerability, while
differences in the mean ranks of community resilience were not statistically significant.
After conducting multiple comparisons between community types, there were significant
differences between Army and Air Force communities in hazard losses. Army communities
had lower total losses per capita, while Air Force communities had greater total losses per
capita. Interestingly, Navy communities had greater losses per capita on average, but that
was due to the outlier of Monroe County, FL ($152,285). Non-parametric statistical tests
reduced the impacts of outliers on results, as shown in the mean rank values. When
conducting multiple comparisons for social vulnerability, significant differences were
found, where Air Force communities had significantly higher SoVI scores than Navy
communities.
Table 4.6. Comparing between military community type (Kruskal-Wallis test).
Military
Mean
Adjusted H
N
Mean
p-value***
Community Type
Rank
Statistic
34
Army
$2,950
40.6*
Hazard
31
Air Force
$8,275
57.5*
7.72
.027
Losses
28
Navy
$9,378
43.2
34
Army
-1.13
45.2
31
SoVI
Air Force
-0.21
56.6**
6.85
.033
28
Navy
-1.92
38.5**
34
Army
2.70
40.7
31
BRIC
Air Force
2.76
52.7
3.30
.192
28
Navy
2.75
48.3
* Differences in the mean ranks of hazard losses between Army and Air Force communities
were statistically significant (p =.034) ** Differences in mean ranks of SoVI between Air
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Force and Navy communities were statistically significant (p =.03) *** Bonferroni
correction applied for multiple tests.
4.7 DIFFERENCES IN SOVI FACTORS WITHIN MILITARY COMMUNITIES
Once again, the overall SoVI score was unpacked to identify the factors
contributing to the significant differences between communities by type of military base.
Multinomial regression was performed using standardized SoVI factors as independent
variables and the type of military community (Army, Air Force, and Navy) as dependent
variables. Only 84 out of the 106 military communities were included in the model to
reconcile differences in the number of Army, Air Force, and Navy communities. The 28
Navy communities were used in the model, along with random samples of 28 Army and
28 Air Force communities.

This was done to follow the same binary logit model

procedures examining differences between military and non-military communities. The
resulting model was statistically significant ( 𝜒 ! (16) = 65.5 , 𝑝 = .000) and correctly
identified the different types of military communities 71.4% of the time for Army, 75% for
Air Force, and 67.9% for Navy communities.
Wealth (low), race (African American) and social status, and gender were the three
factors that significantly contributed to differences in social vulnerability between Navy
and Air Force communities (Table 4.7). With a one-unit increase in the wealth (low) factor,
communities were 43 times more likely to be classified as Air Force than Navy and 11
times more likely to be classified as Army than Navy communities. As noted earlier in the
spatial analysis, military communities generally had similar wealth values as those around
them and similar high and low-value clusters (no outliers). Therefore, larger amounts of
wealth in Navy communities, or the lack of wealth in Army and Air Force communities,
were likely due to Navy communities' geographic location on the coasts.
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Only three naval communities had low levels of wealth (Onslow, NC, Yuma, AZ,
and Kleberg, TX), and 16 out of the 28 Navy communities had wealth (low) factor scores
less than negative 1, indicating high levels of wealth. In contrast, not a single Army and
Air Force community had a wealth (low) factor less than negative 1, indicating a lack of
wealth comparatively. The existing level of wealth is an essential factor to consider when
assessing the communities’ ability to prepare and mitigate against adverse disaster
outcomes.
Table 4.7: Multinomial logistic regression results with SoVI factors displayed by
descending Wald statistic by military community type.
Wald
Odds
Likely category with
Factor
B
p-value
ratio
one unit increase
𝜒!
Significant factors between Air Force and Navy (negative denotes AF association)
Wealth (low)
-3.78
12.9
.000
43.45*
Air Force
Race (African Am.
1.64
5.79
.016
5.12
Navy
and Social Status)
Gender (female)

-1.64

4.90

.027

5.13*

Air Force

Significant factors between Army and Navy Communities
Wealth (low)
-2.41
9.14
.002
11.15*
Army
Ethnicity (Hispanic)

.949

.449

.034

2.58

Navy

Significant factors between Army and Air Force (negative denotes Army association)
Race and Social
-1.52
8.19
.004
4.57*
Army
Status
Special Needs

2.43

5.24

.022

11.31

Air Force

*Inverted Odds-Ratio
Higher levels of race (African American) and social status were associated more
with Army and Navy communities than Air Force communities. A one-unit increase in race
and social status vulnerability was about five times less likely to be attributed to Air Force
communities. Again, very few outliers existed in the spatial analysis of race and social
status, so these differences were most likely due to Army, Air Force, and Navy
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communities' geographic location. Only about a third of Air Force communities were in
the South, compared to two-thirds of all Army communities and three-quarters of all Navy
communities. Army and Navy communities were more heavily concentrated in the South,
and therefore had higher levels of race and social status vulnerabilities. The special needs
factor of social vulnerability was a significant contributor to the model between Army and
Air Force communities. With a one-unit increase in the special needs factor, Air Force
communities were 11 times more likely to be selected by the model. This was also due to
special needs vulnerabilities having high-value clusters in the Great Plains, where more
Air Force communities are overall.
4.8 DIFFERENCES IN CAPITALS OF BRIC WITHIN MILITARY COMMUNITIES
The multinomial logit model using the capitals of community resiliency was not
significant (𝜒 ! (10) = 13.3 , 𝑝 = .208) and only classified Army communities correctly
54% of the time, Air Force communities 39% of the time, and Navy communities 54%,
which was not significantly better than random choice. Community capital was the only
significant contributor to the model (𝑝 = .03). When multiple comparisons were
conducted, significant differences were found between Army and Navy communities (B =
-.988, Wald 𝜒 ! = 5.65, p = .017). With a one-unit increase in community capital, military
communities were 2.7 times more likely to be classified as Army communities than Navy.
Navy communities were in the Pacific Northwest, the southwestern U.S., and along the
Atlantic Coast, where low community clusters were located. Army communities were
located mostly in areas with higher community capital values, such as Kentucky, Alabama,
and South Carolina. Only one Navy community had a community capital score greater than
the mean, compared to the eight Army communities that met the same criteria.
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4.9 HAZARD LOSSES COMBINED WITH SOVI AND BRIC
Comparing SoVI and BRIC scores in communities helped identify communities'
underlying conditions but only provided part of the picture. Past economic losses should
also be considered when comparing the hazardousness of places. As found earlier, hazard
losses are significantly lower in military communities than in others, and Army
communities had significantly lower damages than non-military military communities.
However, many military communities have experienced significant damages from hazards
in the past. Table 4.8 displays the ten military communities with the highest hazard losses
per capita from 1960-2018.
Table 4.8. Military communities with the highest hazard losses per capita (1960-2018).
Crop
Property
Total Losses
Major Military
Location
Losses Per
Losses Per
Per Capita
Base
Capita($)
Capita ($)
($)
Monroe
NAS Key West
5,999
146,287
152,285
County, FL
Grand Forks
Grand Forks
554
70,938
71,492
County, ND
AFB
Jackson
Altus AFB
1,113
40,642
41,755
County, OK
JB ElmendorfAnchorage, AK
1
34,491
34,492
Richardson
Harrison
Keesler AFB and
177
34,032
34,209
County, MS
NCBC Gulfport
Santa Rosa
NAS Whiting
326
33,275
33,601
County, FL
Field
Okaloosa
Elgin AFB
168
23,330
23,498
County, FL
Coffee County,
Fort Rucker
1,998
13,623
15,621
AL
Escambia
NAS Pensacola
101
14,350
14,451
County, FL
Meade
Ellsworth AFB
560
12,680
13,240
County, SD
Source: Data compiled by author from SHELDUS
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All military communities located along the Gulf of Mexico are within the top ten
hazard losses per capita, except for Bay County, FL (top 13). Hurricanes, the most
expensive type of hazard in the U.S., have wreaked havoc on military communities in
recent years (Gall et al., 2009). Grand Forks County, ND, and Jackson County, OK were
two communities that were unexpected to be in the top three due to the relatively little
media attention the Midwest receives (Figure 4.8). Grand Forks experienced frequent
riverine flooding events along the Red River of the North, while Jackson County,
Oklahoma, located along the Red River of the South, experienced severe storms, tornadoes,
and periodic flooding. Most of the damages in these communities were due to a singularly
large hazard event. In Grand Forks, the 1997 Red River Flood caused over $60,000 in
damages per capita while in Jackson County, OK, severe storms and high winds caused
over $35,000 in damages per capita in 2008. These single hazard events led to Presidential
Disaster Declarations and accounted for over 85% of Jackson and Grand Forks Counties'
damages in the 59-year dataset.
Anchorage, Alaska, experienced the deadly 1964 Great Alaskan earthquake, its
most damaging event. Anchorage experienced other hazards as well, such as severe winter
weather, flooding, and even wildfire. Coffee County, Alabama, located 60 miles from the
Gulf, experienced frequent flooding events as well as occasional tornado outbreaks. The
2007 Enterprise, AL tornado was an EF-4 that destroyed the local high school, several
hundred homes and businesses, and killed nine people, including the children of soldiers
at nearby Fort Rucker (Pitts, 2017). Lastly, Meade County, SD, located on the Black Hills'
eastern slope, experienced many hazard types such as flash flooding, wildfires, landslides,
severe storms, and winter storms.
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Figure 4.8: Total Losses Per Capita in the United States (1960-2018), military communities
in dark outline and hazard losses presented in quartiles.
In addition to a per capita assessment, hazard losses were also adjusted by the size
of the county’s military population (total losses per capita x number of military members).
Results of this adjustment highlight communities where hazard losses have impacted the
most military members. The larger military communities of El Paso County, CO, San
Diego County, CA, and Onslow County, NC, replaced smaller military communities of
Grand Forks, Jackson, and Coffee Counties in the top ten. The other counties along the
Gulf of Mexico and Anchorage, AK, remained. El Paso County, Colorado, with over
30,000 military members, experienced the full spectrum of hazards. Hazard damages in the
Colorado Springs area (El Paso County) totaled $3,800 per capita and included losses from
flooding, wildfires, winter weather, and severe weather like hail. San Diego County had
relatively low damages per capita ($1,473) over the 59-year period, but when multiplied
by the 73,000 military members in the county, it demonstrated that the losses have
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impacted many military families. Compare that to Jackson County, OK, for example,
which had only 1,000 military members but a per capita loss of over $40,000. While the
losses were greater in Jackson County, fewer military members and families were
impacted. San Diego County experienced an increasing amount of hazard losses, however,
mostly due to wildfire. Onslow County, NC, is on the east coast and home to Camp
Lejeune, a Marine Corps base home to 40,000 service members. Onslow residents
experienced frequent flooding events, including large flood losses in 2018 from Hurricane
Florence and other hazards like severe weather.
However, hazard losses only show the magnitude of physical damage that a
community experienced and does not consider the people who bear the brunt of the losses
or how that community recovers. It also skews the results to show counties with singular
or a few large-scale hazard events, compared to more frequent but smaller hazard events.
While Monroe County, FL experienced the most hazard losses by far, the underlying social
vulnerability and resiliency in that county were about average (SoVI = 0.48, BRIC = 2.734)
compared to other places. Similarly, El Paso County, CO and San Diego County, CA had
lower than average social vulnerability and higher resiliency. Onslow County, NC, on the
other hand, had lower social vulnerability but lower resiliency than average, indicating it
may not be as resilient as other communities.
When hazard losses were combined with the underlying measures of social
vulnerability and community resiliency in a community, the community's hazardousness
was assessed. This is not to say that places such as Monroe County, FL are not hazardous
or that there are not vulnerable populations within the county; only that when compared at
the county level, there are other counties that may face worse consequences if a similar
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magnitude hazard event were to occur. Table 4.9 displays the five military communities
that were above the median level of hazard losses ($3,878), above the median SoVI (.30),
and below the median BRIC (2.733). Interestingly, four out of the five are located in the
Southwest.
Val Verde County, TX is located along the U.S. and Mexico border and contains
Laughlin Air Force Base, a relatively small base used to train future Air Force pilots. As
expected, higher social vulnerability in Val Verde was driven by ethnicity (Hispanic) and
service sector employment factors. Low community resiliency in Val Verde was driven by
lower levels of community and institutional capital. It is a smaller county by population
but experienced periodic flooding and severe weather events such as hailstorms that caused
significant damages on a per capita basis. When higher levels of social vulnerability and
lower levels of resiliency were taken into account, these hazard losses were amplified, and
recovery took longer or was uneven within the community. Roosevelt and Curry counties
in New Mexico have almost identical drivers of social vulnerability and resilience as Val
Verde County, Texas, and experienced similar hazards. These counties border each other
and contain Cannon Air Force Base, another smaller-sized base home to an Air Force
Special Operations Wing. Kleberg County is another South Texas county and faces similar
hazard threats like flooding, but it is located along the Gulf Coast and experiences
hurricanes. It has the same drivers of low social vulnerability but also has lower levels of
economic resilience.
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Table 4.9: Military communities greater or less than median thresholds of SoVI and BRIC
respectively, sorted by total hazard losses.
Hazard
Social
Community
Major Military
Location
Losses Per
Vulnerability
Resiliency
Base
Capita ($)
(SoVI)
(BRIC)
Roosevelt
Cannon Air
7,092
2.7
2.558
County, NM
Force Base
Curry
Cannon Air
5,728
0.92
2.627
County, NM
Force Base
Val Verde
Laughlin Air
5,646
5.27
2.553
County, TX
Force Base
Kleberg
Naval Air Station
5,452
3.95
2.726
County, TX
Kingsville
Dale
Fort Rucker
4,873
0.05
2.695
County, AL
One of the constants when comparing both Tables 4.8 and 4.9 is the presence of
Air Force Bases, Naval Air Stations, and an Army Aviation community (Dale and Coffee
County, AL). Airbases, whether Air Force or Navy, appear to be in more hazardous
communities overall when accounting for hazard losses, social vulnerability, and
resiliency. The Gulf of Mexico and highly rural locations in the West provide the military
with large areas over land and sea where aircraft training and missile testing are unfettered.
The Gulf locations provide instant access for fighter pilots and warships to conduct training
in the Eglin Gulf Test and Training Range, located in the eastern half of the Gulf. This area
in the Gulf of Mexico gives the military a vast area to conduct aircraft training and testing,
joint exercises, and weapon testing free from the restrictions in place over more populated
land areas and more trafficked sea areas (DoD, 2018). However, as mentioned earlier, the
coastal airbases along the Gulf are primarily located directly on the water and shoreline,
making them extremely vulnerable to storm surge, wind damage, and flooding from
hurricanes (Figure 4.9). NAS Kingsville, Keesler AFB, NAS Pensacola, Eglin AFB,
Tyndall AFB, NAS Key West, and even more inland locations such as Fort Polk,
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Louisiana, and Fort Rucker, Alabama, have experienced significant damages from
hurricanes in the past.

Figure 4.9: Hurricanes and Military Communities along the Gulf of Mexico. Labeled tracks
are select hurricanes that have significantly impacted military communities and hazard
losses are from all hazards, data from NOAA’s IBTrACS database (Knapp et al., 2018).
Flooding due to extreme precipitation and continued human development, as well
as the frequency of major hurricanes, are likely to continue and increase in the future
(Wuebbles et al., 2014). Communities with a severe risk to hazards like hurricanes are ideal
targets for military and local community partnerships to decrease overall disaster risk.
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) effectively reduce the costs of projects designed to
increase local communities' resilience to hazards (Twigg, 2015). The essential ties between
military bases and local communities can be strengthened by using PPPs to decrease their
vulnerability and increase their resilience to hazards.
4.10 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The combination of both statistical and spatial analysis resulted in a variety of
significant findings in the hazardousness of military communities in the United States.
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First, significant differences were found between military and non-military communities
in hazard losses and social vulnerability. The differences in hazard losses were primarily
explained by military communities' geographic location, whereas many factors, including
location, influenced social vulnerability in military communities. The factor of social
vulnerability found to be the most influential in explaining these differences was age,
where military communities have lower age vulnerability and were low spatial outliers in
high age clusters. The service sector employment factor in SoVI was also an influential
variable in the regression model where communities with higher service sector
vulnerability were more likely classified as military. This was also moderately consistent
across geographies, except in the national capital region.
Second, there were significant differences in social vulnerability between the type
of military community. Communities with Air Force bases had significantly higher SoVI
scores overall, especially when compared to Navy communities. The wealth (low) factor
drove these differences in SoVI, where Navy communities had significantly higher wealth
than Army and Air Force communities, thus reducing their relative levels of social
vulnerability. Race (African American and social status) was also a significant contributing
factor. Air Force communities had a significantly lower race (African American) and social
status vulnerability than Navy and Army communities. This was also a function of location.
Fewer Air Force communities are located in the South, with its historical background of
higher levels of African Americans and lower-income populations.
Third, there was no significant difference between military and non-military
communities and between types of military communities in community resilience.
However, community capital was lower in military communities overall, with increasing
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community capital levels more likely to represent non-military communities. In militarydominated counties, community capital was the lowest capital of resilience in those places.
The differences in community capital were mostly consistent regardless of geographic
location, with just over half of military communities in high-value clusters identified as
low-value outliers. Within military communities, Navy communities had significantly
lower levels of community capital than Army communities. However, this was reflective
of geographic location. Army communities are mostly in high community capital clusters
(Southeast), and Navy communities are located along the coast where there are lower
community capital levels.
Lastly, military communities along the Gulf of Mexico and select military
communities in Alaska and the Dakotas have experienced the most hazard losses per capita.
When hazard losses, social vulnerability, and resilience levels were analyzed together,
aviation hubs in South Texas, New Mexico, and Dale County, AL were most at risk for
adverse disaster outcomes. This was driven by the combination of high Hispanic ethnicity,
high service sector employment, and low levels of community capital. In general, military
communities along the Gulf of Mexico were most at risk to hazards and will likely continue
to be in the future.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Previous studies related to hazards and militaries identified the military’s role in
emergency management. A smaller amount of literature identified how military bases assist
local communities in disaster response and initial recovery. The primary goal of this
research was to understand how military bases influence the underlying conditions of
disaster risk in their communities and the drivers producing that risk. Doing so was a crucial
first step in understanding military communities' overall hazardousness and identifying
communities that may require greater assistance in reducing risk in their communities.
Counties were identified as military communities, and then a variety of statistical and
spatial tests and analyses were conducted, including logistic regression and Anselin Local
Moran’s I.
Results were robust in that military communities have lower social vulnerability
than other communities driven by their lower age vulnerability. The primary factors
increasing the social vulnerability of military communities were service sector employment
and race (African American and social status). Higher levels of service sector vulnerability
were in military-dominated communities, and Air Force communities had the highest
overall social vulnerability levels out of all defense service branches. In community
resiliency, community capital is the primary driver of lower resilience within military
communities, although military communities had higher resiliency levels than non-military
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communities. This finding bridged knowledge from hazards researchers that identified
community capital as necessary for resilient communities with those of psychologists, who
studied the connections between military families and the local community as key to
building resilience at the individual level.
These findings are helpful on several levels. At a basic level, it shows that military
communities are unique places and that military bases and their influence should not be
overlooked or ignored when conducting hazard research or in practice. It also identified
the factors contributing to military communities’ lower social vulnerability and greater
resiliency to hazards. This can help county, state, federal emergency managers, NGOs, and
the Department of Defense allocate funding, prioritize mitigation and resilience projects,
and determine what types of outreach and educational programs should be conducted to
maximize benefits. At a more profound level, it signifies that there are inequities in the
levels of social vulnerability and resilience within military communities that extend beyond
differences in geographic location, such as the differences between neighboring places
around Petersburg and the Hampton Roads region of Virginia.
There are several limitations and shortcomings from this research. The local
impacts and differences in military communities were not observed or were muted at the
county level, except in smaller county geographies and independent cities like Petersburg,
VA. A finer scale of analysis would have improved the results and findings in places like
Beaufort County, SC, due to the large retirement population on Hilton Head Island.
Beaufort County includes Hilton Head and Port Royal Island, the latter home to two
military bases and a younger population, with very different vulnerabilities than the island
of Hilton Head. Also, hazard losses were biased towards more extensive, more extreme
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events like hurricanes. The impacts from less costly and more frequent events were
subdued. Frequent events may not cause extensive direct economic damages but cause
indirect damages connected to school and road closures in communities, for example.
Another limitation of the research is that the regression models did not directly
address spatial autocorrelation. As mentioned previously, this omission is partly addressed
by using Anselin Local Moran’s I to identify spatial outliers, which is useful when spatial
autocorrelation is present in the data (Anselin, 1995). Lastly, the data did not account for
the future impacts of anthropogenic climate change and its association with climatesensitive hazards. This may have underestimated some coastal locations' hazardousness,
such as the Hampton Roads, which are under severe threat from sea-level rise, and even
underestimated the hazardousness of more continental locations, which are at risk to
drought in a warming climate.
Many other aspects regarding the vulnerability and resilience in military
communities were not captured in this research. Military bases create other political,
institutional, and environmental vulnerabilities in communities. Although not the focus of
this research, they are briefly described below:
•The potential of future base realignment and closure commissions (BRAC) or
troop and mission reductions on military bases is a constant threat. Communities spend
money to ‘BRAC proof’ their communities (Sorenson, 2018). Hazards also influence
BRAC decisions (Dixon, 1994).
•Pollution from toxic chemicals, waste, and pollutants on military bases impact
local communities (Davis et al., 2007). The impacts of pollution have also been evidenced
at former military sites (Kopack, 2019).

61

•Civilians cannot receive compensation from federal entities under the
discretionary exclusion of the Federal Tort Claim Act. A dam failure was partially
attributed to the base commander's actions at Fort Jackson in 2015, flooded downstream
off-base homes, and the homeowners could not be compensated for those damages (US
Court of Appeals, 2020; Hamilton, 2016).
•Department of Defense installations do not pay property taxes on their land or
provide any payment in lieu of taxes (PILT) to local communities (H.R.4710). Nonresident military members are also exempt from state income taxes. The impact of these
foregone payments on communities to their underlying vulnerability and resiliency is
unknown.
There are also other positive influences on resiliency and vulnerability in military
communities not captured in this research. These include:
•The newly established military infrastructure resilience (MIR) and defense
community infrastructure pilot program (DCIP) provides additional funding sources in
military communities to increase infrastructure resilience (Congressional Research
Service, 2020).
•Mutual aid agreements can help speed up the initial recovery in local communities
and disaster response (Trivedi, 2020).
•Additional funding and support for local school districts are available for military
communities (Buddin, 2001).
This research was premised on the belief that the Department of Defense and local
communities have a shared responsibility to reduce disaster risk in their communities and
identified the factors in which local communities and military bases can reduce that risk
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(NRC, 2012). To meet the challenges in a future climate and to create resilient military
communities, partnerships need to go beyond emergency response and initial recovery.
Doing so will not only increase the resilience in the community, but also the resilience of
the nation’s military.
The top-down approach used in this research was necessary to understand and
compare military communities' current hazardousness across the U.S. However, it should
not be used as a replacement for local hazard assessments and mitigation plans. As local
communities and military bases continue to work together to increase resilience in their
communities, more guidance, direction, and funding are required at the federal level to set
goals, standards, and equitable policies for all military communities, especially in the face
of global climate change. Future directions of research in hazards and military communities
include assessing vulnerability and resilience over time, especially before and after base
closures or severe hazard events; conducting localized case studies that identify how
military bases influence all phases of the disaster cycle; the effectiveness of PPP’s to reduce
disaster risk reduction, such as those approved by the MIR and DCIP programs; and on
other political and institutional influences on vulnerability and resilience in military
communities that create or reduce disaster risk. Hazards research in communities that
ignore a military base’s presence are likely to miss critical factors influencing their
vulnerability and resiliency, as they were shown to be unique places in the landscape.
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLES AND FACTORS IN SOVI
This appendix identifies the dominant variables used as indicators in SoVI and the
resulting component the variables loaded on after principal component analysis. More
information can be found at the Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute website at
https://artsandsciences.sc.edu/geog /hvri.
Table A.1: Variables and Factors in SoVI
Component

Race (African American
and Social Status)

Wealth (-)

Dependence and Age
(Elderly)
Ethnicity (Hispanic and
Education)

Variables
Percent Black
Percent female headed households
Percent poverty
Percent civilian unemployment
Percent with less than 12th grade education
Percent of housing units with no car
Percent renters
Percent mobile homes
Percent children living in 2-parent families (-)
Median house value
Percent households earning over $200k annually
Median gross rent
Per capita income
Percent Asian
Median age
Percent population under 5 years or 65 and over
Percent households receiving social security benefits
Percent unoccupied housing units
People per unit (-)
Percent Hispanic
% speaking English as 2nd language w/ limit. proficiency
Percent with less than 12th grade education
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Ethnicity Cont.
Special Needs Populations
Race (Native American)
Service Sector
Employment
Female

Percent of pop. without health insurance (county level)
Hospitals per capita (county level only)
Nursing home residents per capita
Percent employment in extractive industry
Percent Native American
Percent employment in service industry
Percent female participation in labor force
Percent female
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APPENDIX B
VARIABLES AND CAPITALS IN BRIC
This appendix shows indicators of community resilience and the corresponding
capital that were used in BRIC. More information can be found at the Hazards and
Vulnerability Research Institute website at https://artsandsciences.sc.edu/geog /hvri.
Table B.1: Variables and Capitals in BRIC
Capital

Social

Economic

Institutional

Infrastructural

Community

Indicator
Health Coverage
Educational Equity
Mental Health
Age
Food Access
Transportation Access
Health Access
Communication Capacity
Special Needs
Language Competency
Business Size
Housing Capital
Multi-purpose retail
Employment
Income and equality (race/ethnicity)
Primary and Tourism Employment dependence
Federal Employment
Distance from state capital
Mitigation Spending
Intercounty partnerships
Flood Insurance Coverage
Population stability
Jurisdictional Uniformity
Nuclear accident planning
Disaster Aid Experience
Crop Insurance
Public Disaster Training
Housing age
Housing type
Sheltering needs
Temporary housing availability
Recovery
Medical capacity
Industrial
Re-supply
Access/Evacuation Potential
Internet Access
Religious involvement
Place attachment (immigrants)
Civic involvement
Place attachment (tenure)
Disaster
volunteerism
Political engagement
Citizen disaster preparedness and response skills
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Environmental

Food Access/Self Sufficiency
Natural buffers
Energy use
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Pervious surfaces
Water stress

APPENDIX C
DATA FOR MILITARY COMMUNITIES
This appendix shows the values for hazard losses per capita, SoVI, and BRIC for
each of the 106 counties that were classified as military counties. This is included so that
readers can explore and understand the hazardousness of other places not mentioned or
referenced in the analysis. Communities are displayed in ascending order by FIPS code
(not shown)
Table C.1: Hazard Losses, SoVI, and BRIC in military communities
Hazard
County, State
Major Military Base
Losses Per
Capita ($)
Coffee County, AL
Fort Rucker
15,621

SoVI BRIC
-0.5

2.743

Dale County, AL

Fort Rucker

4,874

0.05

2.695

Russell County, AL

Fort Benning

2,463

1.08

2.665

Anchorage Municipality, AK

JBER

34,492

-3.69

2.607

Fairbanks North Star, AK

Fort Wainwright

462

-5.09

2.422

Southeast Fairbanks, AK

Fort Greely

5,330

-1.87

2.253

Cochise County, AZ

Fort Huachuca

1,173

1.94

2.474

Yuma County, AZ

MCAS Yuma

914

3.34

2.394

Lonoke County, AZ

Little Rock AFB

3,913

-2.71

2.762

Kings County, CA

NAS Lemoore

6,150

-0.24

2.572

San Diego County, CA

Camp Pendleton

1,474

-2.72

2.580

Yuba County, CA

7,027

-0.81

2.717

3,800

-3.41

2.697

New London County, CT

Beale AFB
Fort Carson and
Peterson AFB
Sub-Base New London

494

-1.34

2.904

Kent County, DE

Dover AFB

1,332

-0.66

2.863

El Paso County, CO
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Bay County, FL

Tyndall AFB

10,322

0.85

2.813

Duval County, FL

Mayport Naval Station

226

0.23

2.790

Escambia County, FL

NAS Pensacola

14,451

-0.3

2.778

Monroe County, FL

NAS Key West

152,285

0.48

2.735

Okaloosa County, FL

Elgin AFB

23,498

-1.05

2.718

Santa Rosa County, FL

NAS Whiting Field

33,601

-3.97

2.742

Bryan County, GA

Fort Stewart

1,081

-3.95

2.885

Camden County, GA

Sub-Base Kings Bay

1,315

-2.49

2.734

Chattahoochee County, GA

Fort Benning

931

-8.07

2.467

Columbia County, GA

Fort Gordon

589

-4.82

2.736

Houston County, GA

Robins AFB

496

-1.5

2.798

Lanier County, GA

Moody AFB

3,760

0.55

2.682

Liberty County, GA

Fort Stewart

1,649

0.34

2.789

Long County, GA

Fort Stewart

1,421

-3.24

2.597

Lowndes County, GA

Moody AFB

899

0.27

2.730

Muscogee County, GA

Fort Benning

359

1.8

2.748

Richmond County, GA

Fort Gordon

505

2.8

2.766

Honolulu County, HA

Pacific Command

587

-4.27

2.570

Elmore County, ID

Mountain Home AFB

1,588

-1.31

2.625

St. Clair County, IL

Scott AFB

1,959

0.26

2.850

Geary County, KS

Fort Riley

949

-0.51

2.847

Leavenworth County, KS

Fort Leavenworth

1,749

-4.44

2.804

Riley County, KS

Fort Riley

1,034

-2.43

2.713

Christian County, KY

Fort Campbell

2,484

-0.12

2.723

Hardin County, KY

Fort Knox

1,007

-1.63

2.885

Meade County, KY

Fort Knox

1,652

-4.75

2.749

Bossier Parish, LA

Barksdale AFB

5,036

-1.4

2.818

Vernon Parish, LA

Fort Polk

10,498

-2.38

2.722

Anne Arundel County, MD

Fort Meade/USNA

441

-6.18

2.841

St. Mary's County, MD

NAS Patuxent River

2,528

-5.5

2.831

Harrison County, MS

Keesler AFB

34,209

1.85

2.783

Lowndes County, MS

Columbus AFB

8,526

0.8

2.749

Johnson County, MO

Whiteman AFB

1,617

-1.59

2.719

Pulaski County, MO

Fort Leonard Wood

3,418

-4.09

2.588

Cascade County, MT

Malmstrom AFB

275

-0.16

2.886

76

Sarpy County, NE

Offutt AFB

2,400

-4.58

2.965

Churchill County, NV

NAS Fallon

215

-0.17

2.626

Curry County, NM

Cannon AFB

5,728

0.92

2.627

Otero County, NM

Holloman AFB

357

2.4

2.530

Roosevelt County, NM

Cannon AFB

7,092

2.7

2.558

Jefferson County, NY

Fort Drum

1,234

-0.73

2.775

Camden County, NC

NSA Hampton Roads

7,724

-3.28

2.858

Craven County, NC

MCAS Cherry Point

4,062

-0.22

2.794

Cumberland County, NC

Fort Bragg

2,075

0.19

2.783

Harnett County, NC

Fort Bragg

4,656

-1.44

2.707

Hoke County, NC

Fort Bragg

11,742

-0.78

2.704

Moore County, NC

Fort Bragg

4,915

0

2.674

Onslow County, NC

MCB Camp Lejeune

2,706

-3.18

2.771

Wayne County, NC

Seymour Johnson AFB

5,064

1.48

2.805

Grand Forks County, ND

Grand Forks AFB

71,492

-1.36

2.927

Ward County, ND

Minot AFB

5,999

-3.2

2.899

Greene County, OH

Wright-Patterson AFB

1,665

-2.56

2.845

Comanche County, OK

Fort Sill

1,687

0.08

2.697

Garfield County, OK

Vance AFB

1,767

1.05

2.816

Jackson County, OK

Altus AFB

41,755

2.77

2.746

Newport County, RI

Naval Station Newport

1,833

-1.58

2.815

Beaufort County, SC

MCAS Beaufort

1,244

0.59

2.670

Berkeley County, SC

Joint Base Charleston

9,597

-3.32

2.783

Richland County, SC

Fort Jackson

775

-0.62

2.853

Sumter County, SC

Shaw AFB

8,596

0.63

2.819

Meade County, SD

Ellsworth AFB

13,240

-4.34

2.777

Montgomery County, TN

Fort Campbell

1,175

-2.44

2.725

Bell County, TX

Fort Hood

2,671

-0.12

2.742

Coryell County, TX

Fort Hood

1,354

-1.46

2.625

El Paso County, TX

Fort Bliss

1,125

5.39

2.592

Kleberg County, TX

NAS Kingsville

5,452

3.95

2.726

Taylor County, TX

Dyess AFB

5,875

1.71

2.778

Tom Green County, TX

Goodfellow AFB

3,645

0.68

2.764

Val Verde County, TX

Laughlin AFB

5,646

5.27

2.553

Wichita County, TX

Sheppard AFB

1,855

0.89

2.776
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Caroline County, VA

Fort A P Hill

884

-3.02

2.765

King George County, VA

NSF Dahlgren

3,767

-6.16

2.844

Prince George County, VA

Fort Lee

4,176

-6.33

2.834

Prince William County, VA

MCB Quantico

546

-6.23

2.720

Stafford County, VA

MCB Quantico

1,460

-8.07

2.743

York County, VA

JBLE

3,178

-5.24

2.798

Alexandria city, VA

Pentagon

353

-2.67

2.655

Chesapeake city, VA

Norfolk Naval Station

512

-4.02

2.883

Hampton city, VA

JBLE

1,307

0.55

2.809

Newport News city, VA

JBLE

1,119

1.07

2.768

Norfolk city, VA

Norfolk Naval Station

803

0.12

2.706

Petersburg city, VA

Fort Lee

3,053

7.75

2.873

Poquoson city, VA

JBLE

6,213

-5.86

3.012

Portsmouth city, VA

Norfolk Naval Station

1,595

1.82

2.870

Suffolk city, VA

Norfolk Naval Station

3,608

-2.44

2.900

Virginia Beach city, VA

NAS Oceana

947

-3.24

2.757

Island County, WA

NAS Whidbey Island

939

-2

2.652

Kitsap County, WA

Shipyard Puget Sound

2,131

-3.76

2.697

Pierce County, WA

JBLM

1,682

-2.91

2.743

Thurston County, WA

JBLM

7,196

-2.75

2.728

Laramie County, WY

F E Warren AFB

4,104

-2.63

2.766
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